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CERCLA: THE PROBLEMS OF LIMITING
CONTRIBUTION CLAIMS FOR POTENTIALLY
RESPONSIBLE PARTIES
I. INTRODUCTION
From the time Congress passed the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA)' in 1980, it has been plagued by many problems and
controversies. 2 One major source of controversy concerns the ability
of potentially responsible parties to sue for contribution without first
facing a section 106 administrative orders or a section 107(a) cost
recovery action 4 under CERCLA. This Comment will specifically
focus on these issues.
Part I of this Comment discusses the background and goals
behind CERCLA. Part II of this Comment will discuss whether the
* proper interpretation of "contribution" within the CERCLA text
requires that parties seeking contribution first be subject to some
action against them. It will also examine Congress' intent in
including the "savings clause" within section 113(f)(1). Finally, Part
II will identify the consequences and ramifications of closing off the
contribution option to those parties who are not subject to a section
106 or section 107(a) action.
Part Ill of this Comment will discuss Congress' intent in
allowing parties to seek contribution under CERCLA. Specifically,
it will analyze and clarify House and Senate Reports that address the
issue of contribution. Moreover, Part III will look at Congress'
rejection of early versions of CERCLA's contribution provisions and
identify what impact, if any, they have on congressional intent.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
2. See Michael V. Hernandez, Cost Recovery or Contribution?: Resolving
the Controversy Over CERCLA Claims Brought by Potentially Responsible
Parties, 21 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 83 (1997).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1994).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
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Finally, Part IV will identify CERCLA's two primary policy
goals and discuss how limiting contribution actions may be
inconsistent with these goals. This section will also discuss how
limits on contribution may undermine the contribution provision's
own incentives for parties to quickly cleanup their own
environmental contamination.
A. Background of CERCLA
The overarching goals of CERCLA are twofold. The first goal,
as its name suggests, is to facilitate the prompt cleanup of
environmentally contaminated waste sites, such as old landfills,
industrial sites, and mining sites, and to shift the costs of these
cleanup efforts from taxpayers to parties responsible for the
environmental harm.5 In other words, CERCLA aims to make
parties, such as large industrial, chemical, and mining companies,
pay for the cleanup of environmentally contaminated sites they
create. CERCLA's second goal is to encourage the careful handling
of hazardous wastes by spreading liability over all responsible
parties. 6 As might be expected from these very far-reaching and
ambitious goals, since its inception twenty years ago, CERCLA has
had enormous impact on commercial, private, and environmental
interests.
7
The huge increase in the cost of environmental cleanup makes
the allocation of cleanup costs among parties under CERCLA very
important. For example, during the 1980s the average cost for the
cleanup of hazardous waste ranged from six to ten million dollars per
site.8 Now, however, the cost has increased to nearly thirty to fifty
million dollars. 9 The cost of restoring areas of environmental
5. See OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574,
1578 (5th Cir. 1997); Susan R. Poulter, Cleanup and Restoration: Who Should
Pay?, 18 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 77, 84-85 (1998); Barbara J.
Gulino, Note, A Right of Contribution Under CERCLA: The Case for Federal
Common Law, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 668, 681-82 (1986).
6. See Gulino, supra note 5, at 681.
7. See Hernandez, supra note 2, at 83.
8. See Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d
344, 349 n.9 (6th Cir. 1998); Thomas C. L. Roberts, Allocation of Liability
Under CERCLA: A "Carrot and Stick" Formula, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 601, 604
(1987).
9. See Centerior Serv. Co., 153 F.3d at 349 n.9; JEFFERY G. MILLER &
CRAIG N. JOHNSTON, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL AND
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damage to their natural state under the natural resources damages
provision of CERCLA may be even bigger. 10 For example, the cost
of restoring one of the larger mining sites in the Western United
States to its natural state was 1.2 billion dollars.
I
Along with its great impact, CERCLA is also plagued by many
problems within the courts system. Many of these controversies
stem from the lack of clarity with respect to its provisions.12 As
stated above, one major controversial issue concerns the ability of a
party to assert a section 113(f) contribution claim under CERCLA
without first facing a prior or pending section 106 administrative
order or a section 107(a) cost recovery action. CERCLA's section
106, section 107(a), and section 113(f) contribution actions are
briefly explained below.
B. The Big Three Defined: CERCLA 's Section 106 Administrative
Orders, Section 107(a) Cost Recovery Actions, and Section 113()
Contribution Actions
A section 106 administrative order under CERCLA allows a
federal agency, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
to order polluters to undertake and complete environmental
cleanups. 13  Specifically, the EPA may issue a section 106 order
when it finds an "imminent and substantial endangerment to the
public health or welfare or environment" due to site contamination.
14
For example, in Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron,'5 following
REMEDIATION 9 (1996); Poulter, supra note 5, at 78.
10. See Poulter, supra note 5, at 78.
11. See id.
12. See United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902, 905 (D.N.H. 1985)
(describing CERCLA as a "last-minute compromise" between three competing
bills that has "acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted
provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history");
Hernandez, supra note 2, at 83.
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(c) (1994) (stating that the EPA shall "establish
and publish guidelines for using the imminent hazard, enforcement, and
emergency response authorities of this section and other existing statutes... to
effectuate the responsibilities and powers created by this chapter"); see also
Centerior Serv. Co., 153 F.3d at 346 (stating that the EPA issued a section 106
administrative order which required Centerior to complete an emergency
cleanup of its contaminated site).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1994); see Centerior Serv. Co., 153 F.3d at 346
n.4.
15. 153 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 1998).
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an investigation into heavily polluted industrial sites, the EPA issued
a section 106 order forcing the plaintiffs to pay almost ten million
dollars in cleanup costs.
1 6
In comparison, a section 107(a) cost recovery action under
CERCLA permits the government or private parties who are not
responsible for the environmental contamination to recover cleanup
costs from potentially responsible parties. 17 Potentially responsible
parties are those parties that may have contributed to the
environmental harm. Thus, parties who incur millions of dollars in
environmental cleanup costs may recover some of that amount from
other private parties, such as current or past owners of the
contaminated facility."8
A contribution claim under CERCLA19 allows a party who is
partially responsible for an environmentally contaminated site, and
hence a potentially responsible party, to "spread out" the costs of the
cleanup by suing other parties who may also be responsible for the
contamination.20 In contrast to a section 107 cost recovery action, a
party who is potentially responsible for the environmental
contamination may assert a contribution claim.21
A typical scenario is as follows: Company A purchases an
industrial site from Company B. Company B's industrial activities
contaminated the site, a fact not known earlier to Company A.
Company A continues to contaminate the site. Company A is
subsequently forced by the State (not Federal) Environmental
Agency to undergo a multi-million dollar cleanup of its site to
16. See id. at 346.
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) (1994) (stating that current and past
owners of a contaminating facility, as well as those who transport or arrange
for the transport of hazardous substances, may be liable for ensuing costs); see
also Aviall Servs. Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 263 F.3d 134, 137 (5th Cir.
2001) (stating that parties who incur environmental cleanup costs are allowed
to recover from "potentially responsible parties"); Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v.
Cummins Engine Co., 107 F.3d 1235, 1238 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that
claims brought by one potentially responsible party must be brought as a
contribution claim).
18. See Aviall Servs. Inc., 263 F.3d at 136-37.
19. This right to contribution is codified in section 113(f) of CERCLA. See
Aviall Servs. Inc., 263 F.3d at 139, 148.
20. See OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574,
1581 (5th Cir. 1997).
21. See Rwnpke ofInd. Inc., 107 F.3d at 1238.
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22comply with the state's environmental laws. To recover some of
this money, Company A sues Company B for contribution under
CERCLA's section 113(f).
23
In light of the above, many courts hold that a potentially
responsible party seeking contribution under section 113(f) must first
be subject to a prior or pending section 106 or section 107(a) action
against it. These courts base their view on their interpretation of
certain provisions within CERCLA and an analysis of its legislative
history. However, it is this author's opinion that these courts are
wrong. A more accurate interpretation of CERCLA and an analysis
of legislative intent and other factors lead to the conclusion that a
potentially responsible party may assert a contribution claim under
CERCLA in the absence of a section 106 or section 107(a) claim
against that party.
C. The Importance ofAsserting a Contribution Claim in the Absence
of a Section 106 or Section 107(a) Action
The ability for parties to assert a contribution claim under
CERCLA in the absence of a section 106 or section 107(a) action
against them is important because, as is consistent with CERCLA's
policy, it provides parties with incentives to undergo voluntary
environmental cleanups.24 The importance of this can be seen in the
example given above. In the above example, Company A, as a
partial contributor to the environmental contamination of the site,
will most likely be considered a potentially responsible party by the
courts.25 As such, it will probably be barred from recovering the
cleanup costs from Company B through a section 107(a) cost
recovery action since most federal courts only allow "innocent"
parties to assert this action. Company A also cannot use section
106 because it is not a federal agency.27 To recover some of its
22. See Aviall Servs. Inc., 263 F.3d at 136.
23. See id.
24. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 188 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2862.
25. See Rumpke oflInd. Inc., 107 F.3d at 1238.
26. See Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d
344, 349 n.9 (6th Cir. 1998); Karl Tilleman & Shane Swindle, Closing the
Book on CERCLA Section 107 "Joint and Several" Claims by Liable Private
Parties, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 159, 174 (1999).
27. See Centerior Serv. Co., 153 F.3d at 347.
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cleanup costs under CERCLA, the only option left for Company A is
to bring a section 113(f) contribution claim against Company B.28
However, if Company A is required to be subject to a prior or
pending section 106 or section 107(a) action, then it is also barred
from asserting a contribution claim against Company B. In effect,
Company A which undertook an extremely expensive cleanup at the
order of the State Environmental Commission, is left "holding the
bag," and unable to recover any of the cleanup costs from Company
B, a party partially responsible for the contamination.
II. THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF "CONTRIBUTION" WITHIN THE
MEANING OF CERCLA ALLOWS CONTRIBUTION CLAIMS EVEN IN THE
ABSENCE OF A SECTION 106 OR SECTION 107(A) ACTION
A. The Common Law Provides the Definition of
Contribution Within CERCLA
The text of the section 113(f) contribution provision states:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person
who is liable or potentially liable under [section 107(a)],
during or following any civil action under [section 106 or
under section 107(a)] .... Nothing in this subsection shall
diminish the right of any person to bring an action for
contribution in the absence of a civil action under [section
106] or [section 107(a)] .29
Nowhere in CERCLA does Congress define "contribution.,
30
As such, it is a well established principle that when Congress does
not define terms of art in a statute, the term should be defined
according to the common law.31  Furthermore, courts may feel
28. CERCLA provides two causes of action for parties to recover cleanup
costs: section 107(a) cost recovery actions and section 113(f) contribution
actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1994); Centerior Serv. Co. 153 F.3d at
347.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1994).
30. See Aviall Servs. Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 263 F.3d 134, 138, 148
(5th Cir. 2001).
31. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). Indeed,
even before the inclusion of the contribution provision in CERCLA, remarks
made before Congress suggested that issues of liability not resolved by
CERCLA, such as joint and several liability, be resolved by federal common
law. See Gulino, supra note 5, at 673.
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constrained to "take it as a given that Congress has legislated with an
expectation that the [common law] principle will apply except 'when
a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident."'
32
Proponents of the view that a party must face a section 106 or
section 107(a) action prior to asserting contribution suggest that this
party must first incur "liability" through some sort of prior judgment
or suit against it.33 Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus. provides a
typical illustration of this approach. Aviall Services (Aviall), an
aircraft maintenance business, bought what turned out to be
environmentally contaminated industrial sites from the defendant,
Cooper Industries (Cooper).34 Several years after the purchase,
Aviall discovered the contamination and notified the Texas Natural
Resource Conservation Commission, who in turn ordered Aviall to
undergo a comprehensive multi-million dollar environmental cleanup
of the sites.35 After completing the cleanup, Aviall then sued Cooper
for contribution under section 113(f) of CERCLA to recover part of
the cleanup costs.36 The court rejected Aviall's contribution claim,
stating that Aviall faced neither a prior or pending section 106
federal abatement action against it, nor a section 107(a) cost recovery
action by the government or a private party.37
The majority's opinion in Aviall, and others like it, are incorrect
because according to the common law principles of contribution set
forth under the Second Restatement of Torts, Black's Law
Dictionary, and American Jurisprudence, parties seeking contribution
do not need to have a prior judgment or even a prior suit against
them.
38
The Second Restatement of Torts' (Restatement) definition of
contribution is particularly important because many courts use it as
32. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (quoting Astoria Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991)).
33. See Aviall Servs. Inc., 263 F.3d at 138 (stating "we believe that the
commonly accepted definition of contribution requires a tortfeasor to first face
judgment before it can seek contribution from other parties."); OHM
Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574 (5th Cir. 1997)
(defining common law contribution as requiring a pending or prior judgment).
34. See Aviall Servs. Inc., 263 F.3d at 136 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 137.
38. See id. at 148.
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persuasive authority for the definition of contribution under
CERCLA.3 9 The Restatement defines contribution as "when two or
more persons become liable in tort to the same person for the same
harm, there is a right of contribution among them, even though
judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them."40 The
comment to this section reinforces the idea that a previous judgment
or suit is not necessary for contribution by stating that "contribution
is allowed in favor of [a tortfeasor] without either judgment or suit
against him, if he pays more than his equitable share of the
(common) liability.",4 1 Nowhere in the Restatement's definition does
it require that a party be sued or face judgment prior to a claim for
contribution. To the contrary, the Restatement is explicit in stating
that a judgment or suit is not necessary against a party seeking
contribution.
42
Admittedly, at first glance the Restatement's definition of
contribution and its comments do seem to suggest that a party
seeking contribution needs to first face some sort of claim against it.
After all, how else do parties "become liable in tort" or become
"tortfeasors"? The answer lies in how the Restatement uses the word
"liability" in its definition of contribution. The Restatement uses the
phrase to "become liable" in the definition because it is addressing
only tort situations. 3 In other contexts, however, the Restatement
also allows contribution where the party merely has a legal
obligation or is compelled to act.44 Thus, when a company is
compelled to act due to an order issued by a State Environmental
Commission, this order satisfies the requirements for contribution
even though the company does not face a legal claim.
39. See Hernandez, supra note 2, at 102. Many courts have used the
Restatement to interpret CERCLA in contribution claims. See United States v.
Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995); Akzo Coatings, Inc.
v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994); County Line Inv. Co. v.
Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir. 1991). The Restatement has also aided
the Supreme Court in interpreting other federal statutes. See Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 87-92 (1981).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886(a) (1977).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886(a) cmt. b (1977).
42. See id.
43. See Hemandez, supra note 2, at 104 n.138.
44. See id. at 103.
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Similarly, the Black's Law Dictionary definition of
"contribution" is in sharp conflict with a requirement that a party
needs to face judgment before seeking contribution. 4' Black's Law
Dictionary defines contribution as the "right that gives one of several
persons who are liable on a common debt the ability to recover
ratably from each of the others when that one person discharges the
debt." 4 6 Furthermore, the definition of "liability" is "[t]he quality or
state of being legally obligated" and "legal responsibility to another
or to society." 47 Liability therefore does not require that a party face
some action (i.e., a section 106 or section 107(a) action) in order to
be liable. Applying these definitions to the contribution provision
within CERCLA, it is clear this provision does not require a prior or
pending section 106 or section 107(a) action before a party can assert
a contribution claim.
Finally, American Jurisprudence 2d also rejects the argument
that a judgment is required before asserting a contribution claim.48
According to American Jurisprudence 2d:
To entitle one co-obligor to contribution from the others, it
is the general rule that the payment made by him must have
been compulsory in the sense that he must have been under
legal obligation to pay .... A payment is deemed in law to
be compulsory when the party making it cannot legally
resist it.49
Moreover, a party may face this compulsory payment even in the
absence of a suit against him or her.50 Parties therefore have a right
to contribution so long as they have compulsory obligations to pay,
45. See Aviall Servs. Inc. 263 F.3d at 148 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
46. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 329 (7th ed. 1999).
47. Id. at 925.
48. See Aviall Servs. Inc., 263 F.3d at 148 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
49. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Contribution § 15 (1985).
50. See Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Lowe Constr. Co., 99 N.W.2d 421,
427 (Iowa 1959) (holding that "[o]ne confronted with an obligation that he
cannot legally resist is not obliged to wait to be sued."); see also Centerior
Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron of Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 351 (6th Cir.
1998) (stating that "[u]nder the common law, however, there was no
requirement that a party be 'adjudged' liable before seeking contribution....
It was enough that a plaintiff act under some compulsion or legal obligation to
an injured party when he or she discharged the payment."); Zontelli Bros. v. N.
Pac. Ry. Co., 263 F.2d 194, 199 (8th Cir. 1959) (holding that there is no
requirement that a party face judgment before being entitled to judgment).
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and they may have compulsory obligations to pay even in the
absence of a judgment or suit against them. Applying this rule to the
situations addressed here, it is quite likely that this compulsory
payment might come in the form of a cleanup order from a State
Environmental Commission, since the party to which the order is
directed faces a legal obligation that it cannot realistically resist. If
this is the case, then these parties may assert contribution claims
even in the absence of a section 106 or section 107(a) action against
them.
B. Section 11369 Contains No Textual Requirement that
Contribution Actions Must Be Preceded by Section 106 or Section
107(a) Actions
Proponents of the view that a section 106 or section 107(a)
action is needed for a contribution claim point to the text of section
113(f)(1), which states that "[a]ny person may seek contribution...
during or following any civil action under [section 106] or under
[section 107(a)]." 51 According to this argument, the word "may"
must mean "shall [or] must" 52 and hence indicates that Congress
intended to allow contribution suits only if there is a prior or pending
section 106 or section 107(a) action.53 Furthermore, this argument
rejects the possibility that the word "may" might alternatively mean
"have liberty to," 54 as defined in Webster's Third New International
Dictionary.55 This alternative and extremely plausible meaning of
"may" would allow a contribution claim without the need for a prior
or pending section 106 or section 107(a) action.
However, to construe section 113(f) so as to allow a contribution
claim only in conjunction with a section 106 or section 107(a) action
would be, so to speak, to put words into the mouth of CERCLA. As
Judge Wiener stated in his dissenting opinion in Aviall, "nowhere
does the plain language of the statute specify that actions for
contribution are allowed 'only' during or following litigation under
51. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
52. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1396 (3d ed.
1986).
53. See AviallServs. Inc. 263 F.3d at 138, 148.
54. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 52,
at 1396.
55. See Aviall Servs. Inc., 263 F.3d at 138.
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CERCLA."56 Thus, courts implying that section 113(f)(1) demands
a section 106 or section 107(a) action-when it plainly does not-are
impermissibly rewriting the language of the statute.57
The court in Mathis v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.58 explicitly
rejected the idea that any civil action was needed before a party
could seek contribution under CERCLA.59 In that case, Mathis
contracted with Velsicol to allow Velsicol to dispose thousands of
drums of industrial waste on Mathis' land.60 After Mathis learned
that the drums were actually filled with hazardous waste, they
brought a trespass suit against Velsicol seeking compensatory and
punitive damages. 61  In a counterclaim, Velsicol brought a
contribution claim against Mathis under CERCLA.62 Mathis argued
that this contribution claim was precluded by the lack of a pending
civil action under section 106 or section 107(a).63 In rejecting this
argument, the court stated:
This statute by its plain terms and meaning prevents
Plaintiffs from maintaining a defense concerning the
pendency of a civil action under CERCLA. Because this
Court has already determined that Plaintiffs are liable
parties under CERCLA, Velsicol has a cause of action for
contribution against Plaintiffs regardless of the existence of
a civil action under sections [section 106] or [section
107(a)]. 64
The idea that a section 106 or section 107(a) action is required before
a party can seek contribution is made even more improbable by
Congress' inclusion of the savings clause.
56. Id. at 146 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
57. See id.
58. 786 F. Supp. 971 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
59. See id. at 975-76.
60. See id. at 973.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 975.
64. Id. at 975-76.
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C. The Savings Clause Expresses Congress's Intent to Allow Parties
to Bring Contribution Actions Absent a Section 106 or Section
107(a) Action Against Them
The savings clause refers to the part of the contribution
provision which states: "[n]othing in this subsection shall diminish
the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the
absence of a civil action under section [106] or section [107]....""
Thus, the plain meaning of the text suggests that even without a
section 106 or section 107 action, a party may still seek contribution
under CERCLA.66
Johnson County Airport Commission v. Parsonitt Co.
67
illustrates how the savings clause may save a party's contribution
claim in the absence of a prior or pending section 106 or section
107(a) claim against it.68 In that case, Johnson County Airport leased
some of its property to the defendant, Parsonitt Company, Inc.
(Parsonitt), for use in its industrial glove dry cleaning business.
69
Johnson County Airport alleged that Parsonitt stored hazardous
chemicals in leaky tanks adjacent to the property and were
responsible for the release of these chemicals onto the property.
70
Johnson County Airport subsequently asserted a section 113(f)
contribution claim against Parsonitt for their allocable share of the
environmental cleanup costs. 71  The court rejected Parsonitt's
argument that the contribution claim was premature because a
section 106 or section 107(a) action was not filed against Johnson
County Airport.72 As the court stated:
Nothing in the language of section 113(f) restricts
contribution actions to parties who have incurred liability
under section 107. To the contrary, the statute provides that
'nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any
person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of
65. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1994).
66. See Aviall Servs. Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 263 F.3d 134, 149
(Wiener, J., dissenting).
67. 916 F. Supp. 1090 (D. Kan. 1996).
68. See id. at 1095.
69. See id. at 1091-92.
70. See id. at 1092.
71. See id. at 1095.
72. See id.
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a civil action under [section 106] or [section 107(a)] of this
title.'
73
In effect, the savings clause "saved" the plaintiffs contribution
claim even absent a section 106 or section 107(a) claim against it.
In spite of the saving clause's lack of ambiguity, however, some
courts have stated that the savings clause just enables parties to bring
contribution claims under state law, and therefore section 106 and
section 107(a) actions remain necessary prerequisites to contribution
claims.74 These courts base this argument on the premise that
interpreting the savings clause to allow contribution suits in the
absence of section 106 or section 107(a) actions would render
redundant the first sentence of section 113(f), which allows parties to
seek contribution "during or following" section 106 or section 107(a)
actions.
75
This analysis is flawed for two reasons. First, despite their
insistence that the savings clause merely allows parties to seek
contribution under state law, nothing in the text of the clause
mentions anything about limiting contribution actions to state law.
76
Second, limiting the savings clause to state law remedial measures is
inconsistent with CERCLA's intention to create a uniform rule of
law.
77
First, by thrusting the word "state" into the statutory language of
the savings clause, the courts are impermissibly rewriting statutory
language.78 Further, even if Congress intended to limit the savings
clause to contribution claims based on state law, it is difficult to
imagine why they would intentionally omit the distinction. This
would be especially bizarre given how Congress made the express
distinction between federal and state law in other areas of CERCLA,
such as its general savings clause.
79
73. Id. (citing to Mathis v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 786 F. Supp. 971, 975
(N.D. Ga. 1991)).
74. See Aviall Servs. Inc., 263 F.3d at 140.
75. See id. at 139-40; see also PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151
F.3d 610, 618 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that the savings clause is not intended to
nullify provisions of the statute that contains it).
76. See Aviall Servs. Inc., 263 F.3d at 140.
77. See Gulino, supra note 5, at 684.
78. See Aviall Servs. Inc., 263 F.3d at 146 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
79. See id. The general savings clause states: "[n]othing in this chapter
shall affect or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities of any person
1119
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Second, the view that the savings clause merely enables parties
to bring contribution suits under state law is also inconsistent with
CERCLA's intention to create a uniform rule of law.80 While thirty-
nine states have contribution laws or allow contribution by judicial
decision, the parameters of these contribution claims may be very
different.81 For example, the timing of these contribution claims
vary and some states may only allow contribution claims once a
judgment or payment of plaintiff's claims are made. 82 A nonuniform
contribution rule may create the incentive for companies that deal
with hazardous wastes to do business in those states that have
favorable contribution laws, or no contribution law at all.83
Congressional fear of this outcome was evident in a statement
made before the House: "To insure the development of a uniform
rule of law, and to discourage business dealing in hazardous
substances from locating primarily in states with more lenient laws,
the bill will encourage the further development of a Federal common
law... ,84 Given this statement, it seems highly unlikely that
Congress restricted the savings clause to mean that parties can only
bring contribution claims under state law, since the ultimate effect of
this meaning is contrary to their intent to develop a uniform rule of
law!
D. The Two Avenues of CERCLA
As stated earlier, once a site is cleaned up, CERCLA provides
two causes of action for parties to recover the response costs incurred
by the cleanup effort: joint and several cost recovery actions
governed exclusively by section 107(a), 85 and contribution actions as
set forth in section 113(f).86  Closing off the ability to seek
under other Federal or State law ...... 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (1994).
80. See Gulino, supra note 5, at 673.
81. See id. at 684.
82. See id.
83. While it may be argued that Congress intended to supplement state
contribution laws through the savings clause, and hence close the gap between
federal and state environmental laws, it is argued here that interpreting the
savings clause as merely a device for contribution actions under state law goes
far beyond supplementing. See id.
84. Id. at 673.
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1994); Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap
Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d at 344, 347 (6th Cir. 1998).
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contribution for parties that are not subject to a section 106 or section
107(a) action would be to deny both of these avenues to parties that
might otherwise recover costs incurred by the cleanup effort.
Potentially responsible parties are already precluded from
seeking a section 107(a) recovery action in the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, thus
blocking the first avenue by which these parties can seek recovery
for their cleanup costs.87 Moreover, while the Eighth Circuit has
never directly ruled on this issue, it too has suggested that potentially
responsible parties are precluded from seeking a section 107(a)
action.
88
In closing off the section 107(a) avenue, many of these courts
rely upon the availability of section 113(f) to provide a course of
action for potentially responsible parties. For example, in New
Castle County v. Halliburton Nus Corp.89(New Castle County), the
court rejected New Castle's argument that a party responsible for
environmental contamination could assert its own section 107(a)
claim against another potentially responsible party.90 In denying
New Castle's section 107(a) claim, the court did point out the
availability of section 113(f) contribution claims.91 As the court
stated, "[s]ection 113 provides potentially responsible persons with
the appropriate vehicle for such recovery."
92
But the requirement of a section 106 or section 107(a) action
before a contribution claim could be brought effectively closes off
this second avenue for potentially responsible parties that courts such
as New Castle County rely upon. As a result, parties that are
partially at fault for the contamination of the site face the real
possibility of having both causes of action denied under CERCLA.
87. See Centerior Serv. Co. 153 F.3d at 349; Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C.
Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 936 (8th Cir. 1995); United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-
Ferris Indus. Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1183
(1995); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1989);
Tilleman & Swindle, supra note 26, at 174.
88. See Centerior Serv. Co., 153 F.3d at 349; see also Control Data Corp.,
53 F.3d at 936 (commenting on the parties' liability for "any other necessary
cost of response incurred by any other person."); Amoco Oil Co., 889 F.2d at
672 (discussing relevant factors in determining party's share of costs).
89. 111 F.3d 1116 (3dCir. 1997).
90. See id. at 1121.
91. See id. at 1122.
92. Id.
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III. THE INCONCLUSIVENESS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
At best, legislative history is murky as to whether Congress
intended for a party seeking contribution under CERLCA to first be
subject to a prior or pending section 106 or section 107(a) action
against it.
A. Neither House nor Senate Reports Definitively Indicate
Congressional Intent
Proponents of the view that a section 106 or section 107(a)
action is required for a contribution action point to two statements
made within the House of Representatives and Senate Reports to
support their claim that legislative history "overwhelmingly"
supports their view. 93 As will be seen, however, these statements do
not mandate this view.
Advocates of this view point to the House Conference Report on
amendments to CERCLA to support their proposition that a party
seeking contribution must first incur liability pursuant to section 106
or section 107(a).94 According to this Report, "[t]his section clarifies
and confirms the right of a person held jointly and severally liable
under CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially liable
parties .... 95 However, to infer from this language that the House
intended to make section 106 or section 107(a) actions a prerequisite
to contribution claims is faulty because this statement does not say
only a person who is held jointly and severally liable can seek
contribution. 96 Instead, it merely reaffirms the right of a person who
is jointly and severally liable to seek contribution.
The Senate Report on the CERCLA amendments is similarly
ambiguous. According to the Report, the contribution provision
allows "parties found liable under sections 106 or 107 have a right of
contribution, allowing them to sue other liable or potentially liable
parties to recover a portion of the costs paid .... The language of
this report is not definitive on this issue because, as discussed above,
93. See Aviall Servs. Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 263 F.3d 134, 140 (5th
Cir. 2001).
94. See id. at 141.
95. H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 79 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861; see AviallServs. Inc., 263 F.3d at 141.
96. See Aviall Servs. Inc., 263 F.3d at 146 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
97. S. REP. NO. 99-11, at 43 (1985); see Aviall Servs. Inc., 263 F.3d at 141.
1122
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW.REVIEW [Vol. 35:1107
action for contribution or indemnity against any other person liable
to [sic] potentially liable."'' Like the contrast between the version of
the contribution provision the Senate rejected and the current
provision, here the contrast also suggests that Congress did not
intend to limit contribution actions to only those parties who faced a
section 106 or section 107(a) action. The substitution of the word
"person" in place of "defendant" in the current provision is
particularly telling because by rejecting the "defendant" label,
Congress also seemed to be rejecting the requirement that the person
be a party to some prior or current judicial action before asserting a
contribution claim.
IV. CERCLA POLICY
A. Requiring a Section 106 or Section 107(a) Action Before a Party
Can Seek Contribution Is Inconsistent with CERCLA 's Two Primary
Policy Goals
CERCLA has two primary policy goals: (1) "to facilitate the
prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to shift the cost of
environmental response from the taxpayers to the parties who
benefitted [sic] from the wastes that caused the harm;"'2 and (2) to
"encourag[e] [the] careful handling of hazardous wastes."' 0 3  An
interpretation that a section 106 or section 107(a) action is required
before a party may seek a contribution claim is inconsistent with
both of these policy goals.
1. The first policy goal
Some courts acknowledge that the section 106 or section 107(a)
requirement for contribution does provide parties with a disincentive
to voluntarily undertake cleanup operations, yet have nonetheless
made this a requirement.104  These courts make the rather
incredulous statement that this is nevertheless consistent with the
101. Aviall Servs. Inc., 263 F.3d at 151 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-253, pt. 1,
at 188 (1985)).
102. OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574,
1578 (5th Cir. 1997).
103. Gulino, supra note 5, at 681.
104. See Aviall Servs Inc., 263 F.3d at 144; Rumpke of Ind., Inc. v.
Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 107 F.3d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1997).
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for parties seeking contribution under CERCLA it is enough that
they are "liable" in the sense that they face some legal compulsion,
not in the sense they faced some judgment or suit.98 In other words,
under the common law, parties can seek contribution even in the
absence of a judgment or suit. Accordingly, the Senate Report's use
of the word "liability" does not indicate their intent one way or the
other.
While this report does not make it clear whether the Senate
intended to allow parties to assert contribution claims in the absence
of section 106 or section 107(a) actions against them, it certainly
does not rule this possibility out. In any event, the report is hardly
determinative as to whether these two actions are required.
B. Congress's Rejection of Early Versions of CERCLA's
Contribution Provision Suggests Their Approval of Contribution
Claims Made Even Absent Section 106 or Section 107(a) Actions
The Senate rejected an early version of the contribution clause
that stated "[aifter judgment in any civil action under section 106 or
[section 107(a)], any defendant held liable or potentially liable in the
action may bring a separate action for contribution against any other
person liable or potentially liable under [section 107(a)]." 99  In
contrast, the current version of the contribution clause provides that
"[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other person who is
liable or potentially liable under section [107(a)]... , during or
following any civil action under section [106]... or under section
[107(a)]."' 0  Congressional intent to allow parties to seek
contribution in the absence of a section 106 or section 107(a) action
against them is suggested by their omission of the phrase "after
judgment in any civil action" and the replacement of "defendant"
with "person" in the final version of the provision.
The House also rejected an early version of the contribution
clause. That version provided that "any defendant alleged or held to
be liable in an action under section 106 or section 107 may bring an
98. For a discussion of how the common law definition of contribution does
not require that parties face judgment or suit before seeking contribution see
supra Part II.A.
99. Aviall Servs. Inc., 263 F.3d at 151 (quoting S. REP. No. 99-11, at 103
(1985)).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1994).
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policy goals of CERCLA because Congress did not want to include
an expansive cause of action when it amended CERCLA to explicitly
include contribution.1
0 5
This approach is found in Rumpke of Indiana v. Cummins
Engine Co.'06 (Rumpke). In that case, Rumpke bought a 273-acre
landfill from the sellers, believing it to be free from hazardous
waste.10 7 Several years later, Rumpke discovered that the landfill
was heavily contaminated with toxic waste from a nearby recycling
plant.'0 8  Without prompting from either the State of Indiana
Department of Environmental Management or the Federal
Environmental Protection Agency, Rumpke expressed its intent to
cleanup the landfill. 0 9 Rumpke subsequently brought a section
107(a) cost recovery and a section 113(f) contribution action against
the defendants, who in the past sent hazardous waste to the recycling
plant that ended up being dumped at the landfill." 0 In considering
Rumpke's section 113(f) contribution claim, the court stated that a
prior or pending section 106 or section 107(a) action against Rumpke
was required before any contribution suit could be brought."' It
continued by making the puzzling statement that this requirement
"seems to provide a disincentive for parties voluntarily to undertake
cleanup operations .... This appears to be what the statute requires,
however." 112 Still other courts have argued that this requirement will
not necessarily discourage voluntarily cleanups because these parties
can also rely on state law to assert contribution. 1 3 Both of these
arguments are incorrect.
In regard to the Rumpke court's statement, there are two
possibilities. First, it is possible that Rumpke is correct, and
Congress does expect parties to voluntarily undertake cleanup
operations while it simultaneously throws a section 113(f) roadblock
105. SeeAviall Servs. Inc., 263 F.3d at 144.
106. 107 F.3d 1235 (7th Cir. 1997).
107. See Rwnpke ofInd Inc., 107 F.3d at 1236.
108. See id. at 1236-37.
109. See id. at 1239.
110. Seeid. at 1238.
111. Seeid. at1241.
112. Id.
113. See Aviall Servs. Inc. 263 F.3d at 144-45. For a discussion of how
limiting the savings clause to state law actions would be inconsistent with
CERCLA policy see supra Part II.C.
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in their way. This would be puzzling indeed and, judging by the tone
of the Rumpke court's statement, they seemed puzzled by this
possibility as well.n
4
The second, more plausible possibility is that the Rumpke
statement is wrong, and Congress intended to allow parties to assert
contribution claims in the absence of section 106 or section 107(a)
actions. This is more plausible for two reasons. First, as discussed
above, CERCLA's text and much of its legislative history strongly
suggest that Congress had no intention of requiring either a section
106 or section 107(a) action. Hence, the Rumpke court is incorrect
when it states that "[t]his appears to be what the statute requires.""
' 5
Second, and perhaps most importantly, this possibility is far more
consistent with CERCLA's stated goals. To force parties to wait
until they are subject to a section 106 or section 107(a) action
"encourages [potentially responsible parties] to postpone, defer, or
delay remediation and to 'lie behind the log' until forced to incur
cleanup costs." 1 6 By allowing parties to assert contribution claims
in the absence of section 106 or section 107(a) actions against them,
parties now have the incentive to undergo voluntarily cleanup
operations, an outcome perfectly in line with CERCLA's policy
goals.
2. The second policy goal
Restrictions on contribution would also be a disincentive for
hazardous waste companies to carefully manage their waste.
Contribution encourages such companies to carefully manage their
hazardous waste because it spreads the cleanup costs across all the
responsible parties." 7 If claims for contribution are restricted by the
section 106 and section 107(a) requirement, then many of these
parties may escape liability given the federal government's difficulty
in tracking down and suing the responsible parties."
8
The government faces this difficulty because there may be
decades between the time of the pollution and the cleanup." 9 In the
114. See Runpke oflnd. Inc., 107 F.3d at 1241.
115. Id. at 1241.
116. AviallServs. Inc., 263 F.3d at 156.
117. See Gulino, supra note 5, at 682.
118. See id.
119. See Poulter, supra note 5, at 90.
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meantime, those responsible for the pollution may be unavailable,
out of business, or unable to pay for the tremendous costs of the
cleanup. 120 Furthermore, where the polluter is a large corporation,
the shareholders who reap the benefits of the polluting activities may
be different from the shareholders who face losses due to CERCLA
liability. 121 In light of the government's difficulties (and presuming
that would-be polluters know about these difficulties), it is very
possible that would-be polluters have little incentive to carefully
manage their wastes unless they face the real possibility of paying
for their carelessness following contribution suits against them.
B. The Section 106/107(a) Requirement Undermines the
Contribution Provision's Own Incentive for Quick Cleanups
In addition to the general CERCLA goals of the quick and
careful cleanup of hazardous wastes, the contribution provision itself
provides companies with incentives to conduct quick cleanups and to
cooperate with the government. 122  The provision expressly
authorizes courts to take into account "equitable factors," such as a
company's level of cooperation with the government, when
allocating costs between responsible parties, thus encouraging parties
to act quickly. 23 As a consequence of a section 106 or section
107(a) prerequisite for contribution, companies facing huge
environmental cleanup costs would drag their feet, knowing that a
section 106 or section 107(a) suit must be filed against them before
they could diffuse the tremendous cost by seeking contribution
against other responsible companies. This seems clearly contrary to
the contribution provision's emphasis on quick cleanups.
Other courts argue, however, that potentially responsible parties
have other incentives other than contribution claims to conduct quick
and careful cleanups. For example, the court in Pinal Creek Group
v. Newmont Mining Corp.124 (Pinal Creek) held that regardless of
any possibility of contribution, a company would engage in a
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d
344, 354 (6th Cir. 1998).
123. See id.; Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672-73 (5th Cir.
1989).
124. 118 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1997).
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cleanup effort itself to protect its ongoing interests and could control
these cleanup costs better if it did not have to wait for government
intervention.1
25
There is very little evidence, however, to support the extremely
optimistic proposition that polluting companies would be willing to
undergo extremely expensive cleanup efforts for the sake of any of
its ongoing interests. In fact, the opposite seems to be true. For
example, in the Aviall case, Aviall voluntarily contacted the Texas
Natural Resource Conservation Commission after discovering the
contaminated state of its industrial sites. 126  As a result, the
Commission ordered Aviall to undergo a decade-long, multi-million
dollar cleanup of these sites despite the fact that Cooper Industries,
the previous operator of the sites, was also heavily responsible for
the contamination. Since the court denied Aviall's contribution
claim against Cooper Industries, Aviall failed to recover any of the
cleanup costs from them under CERCLA.
From the harsh lesson of the Aviall case, it is not difficult to
imagine why companies in the future might be unwilling to
voluntarily report environmental problems with their sites. Despite
the holding in Pinal Creek, without the possibility of contribution it
is unlikely that industrial companies in the future will voluntarily
report any sort of environmental contamination to government
agencies. This is true because they have no incentive to report if
they know they cannot recover some of the cleanup costs from other
potentially responsible parties. This outcome is clearly contrary to
the contribution provision's incentive for quick cleanups.
The optimistic proposition that a company would voluntarily
undergo cleanups to avoid the increased costs associated with
government intervention is similarly doubtful. As stated above,
many parties escape liability because it is very difficult for the
federal government to locate and sue all the responsible parties.
127
These companies may find it more economical to try to escape
liability rather than voluntarily undergo expensive cleanups.
Furthermore, many companies will not voluntarily undergo cleanups
125. See id. at 1305.
126. See Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 263 F.3d 134, 136 (5th
Cir. 2001).
127. For a discussion of the federal government's difficulty in tracking down
and suing the appropriate parties see supra Part IV.A.2.
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for fear of government intervention, precisely because they know
that only through a section 106 or section 107(a) intervention will
they be able to seek contribution. Absent the possibility of a
contribution claim without being subject to either of these two
actions, these companies will face tremendous disincentives to
voluntarily undergo expensive cleanups.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, there are three major reasons why it is incorrect to
require potentially responsible parties seeking contribution under
CERCLA to first face a prior or pending section 106 or section
107(a) action against them.
First, it is clear that since CERCLA does not define
"contribution," the courts should adopt its common law meaning.
The common law interpretation of "contribution" does not require a
prior or pending action or suit against a party for that party to seek
contribution. Accordingly, the requirement that a party seeking
contribution must face a section 106 or section 107(a) action flies in
the face of the common law.
Second, legislative history is unclear as to whether Congress
even intended this requirement. Indeed, if anything can be drawn
from the House and Senate Reports, Congress leaned away from any
such limitation on parties seeking contribution. This is evident in
how Congress rejected the versions of CERCLA's contribution
provision that would clearly require section 106 or section 107(a) as
prerequisites to contribution.
Finally, this requirement is totally inconsistent with the stated
policies of CERCLA. The whole premise behind CERCLA is to
make parties who are responsible for environmental contamination
pay for the cleanup. This goal is not fulfilled by requiring parties
wishing to undergo environmental cleanups to first face a section 106
or section 107(a) action. The requirement not only takes away the
incentives for polluting parties to voluntarily undergo cleanups, it
actually provides them with a disincentive to even report
contamination to environmental agencies.
With the skyrocketing costs of environmental cleanup in recent
years, the issue of who pays for what is likely to come to center stage
in the coming years. While CERCLA does an admirable job of
trying to fairly allocate the costs of cleanup among the tens or even
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hundreds of possible parties that might be responsible for the
contamination, it must not be allowed to be shackled by unintended
and unnecessary limits.
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